Erdogan’s Other Kurdish Problem
Denise Natali writes that there is a large gap between what Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan can deliver and what average Kurds expect from the Imrali peace talks.
The cease-fire called by Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah "Apo" ["Uncle"] Ocalan has added momentum to the Imrali Process, fueling hopes that a solution to Turkey’s decades-old Kurdish problem is possible. Whereas springtime has generally meant a recommencement of PKK warfare, according to Ocalan, it now represents a “new phase for a new Turkey and a new Middle East.” The cease-fire also comes at a time when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is engaged in deal-making with the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), promising a new constitution that assures Kurdish rights in exchange for support for his presidential aspirations.
Yet, despite Ocalan’s call for “arms to be silenced and for ideas to speak” and Erdogan’s promise to “drink hemlock to resolve the [Kurdish] problem,” neither man has addressed the heart of the Kurdish issue in Turkey: recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity as part of Turkish citizenship and the political demands associated with it. Also, Erdogan’s interpretation of the Kurdish problem remains unclear, wavering between PKK terrorism and Kurdish cultural rights. Unless these key issues are addressed this “historical moment” may represent nothing more than another temporary cease-fire that could lead to even greater conflict between Kurds and the Turkish state.
Indeed, Turkey’s current efforts to address the Kurdish problem are noteworthy and differ in important ways from previous attempts. Never before has a Turkish official engaged Ocalan and PKK leaders in the field as publicly as Erdogan has done during the Imrali Process, alongside an open commitment to resolving the Kurdish issue. Turkish public opinion about the Kurdish problem has also shifted since the onset of the PKK insurgency in the late 1970s. Most Turkish populations have indicated their fear and fatigue of losing their sons to war against the PKK and seek an end to the conflict. Many also recognize that the Kurds are a distinct group and not simply “Mountain Turks.”
Still, equally remarkable is what has been left out of the Imrali Process. There has been no mention of Kurdish political claims, no discussion of democratic autonomy, no talk about Kurdish language rights, and no release of Kurdish prisoners — all which form the basis of BDP and Kurdish nationalist demands in Turkey. Nor has there been any discussion of what to do with the thousands of PKK fighters who are expected to hand in their weapons and depart Turkey. The most likely place would be the nearest sanctuary or political vacuum; Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria and/or Iran, which appears to be more like a displacement of Turkey’s Kurdish problem and not a solution to it.
