Israeli-Turkish Reconciliation Not a Done Deal
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's aspirations to become leader of the Sunni Muslim world could hinder rebuilding strategic ties with Israel, argues Ben Caspit.
Exactly one month after that surprising phone call between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan under the protective gaze of US President Barack Obama, the two sides have finally started talking. An Israeli delegation consisting of two persons arrived in Ankara to meet with senior Turkish officials [April 22] and bridge the differences between the two countries. These emissaries are National Security Adviser Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror and the Special Emissary for Turkish Affairs Yosef Ciechanover. They have no simple task ahead of them. The Turks are demanding over $1 million for each of the victims' families in reparations, while the sum that Israel is talking about is considerably less. But money will not be the obstacle along the road to rehabilitating Israeli-Turkish relations.
Our story is much more complex and convoluted than mere money might suggest. It encompasses geopolitical and strategic processes of much greater weight. It involves a tectonic shift of the continental plates, which began long ago and which stands in conflict with the strategic interests of at least some of the key players in the Middle East, chief among them Israel and the US. And, as always, there is a substantive debate between two distinctly different approaches. The bad news is that as of the writing of this piece, the rehabilitation of Israeli-Turkish relations seems much more distant and problematic than was previously thought. It’s like a military march, with full gear and stretchers open, but with no clear end point.
In Israel, before the Obama visit, two main attitudes toward Turkey competed for supremacy. The first approach, and also the more draconian, was championed by former Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman and Moshe (“Bugi”) Ya’alon, before his appointment as minister of defense. This approach claims that reconciliation efforts are a waste of time and energy. Erdogan didn’t decide to sever his relationship with Israel because of the Marmara flotilla raid. He actually made his decision long before that. This claim can be proved rather easily by examining a series of harsh incidents that occurred between the Turkish prime minister and his Israeli colleagues.
Chief among these, of course, is the Davos incident, in which Erdogan stormed off a panel he was on with President Shimon Peres. Erdogan is an Islamist, say the proponents of this viewpoint. He is the Muslim Brotherhood, and his party is a sister party to Hamas. He wants to sever ties with Israel so that he can become the Sunni leader of the Middle East. He wants Turkey to be the major power in the Mediterranean Basin. He would effectively like to restore the past splendor of the Ottoman Empire.
