US President Barack Obama's decision to arm the Syrian opposition represents another episode in the tortuous process of pushing from behind, a process that began with the president’s August 2011 demand that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad step aside.

This demand remains the boldest statement Obama has made on the issue, and it identified the president personally with the goal of Assad's ouster. At the time of his announcement, however, Obama was voicing an aspiration more than a policy. There have been no more bold statements since. Instead, Washington has been playing catch-up, on the battleground and in merry-go-round meetings across Europe and the Middle East. The announcement to expand military support for the rebels in an undefined manner continues this uninspiring pattern.

In February, Obama's new secretary of state, John Kerry, argued that the objective of US efforts was to compel Assad to “change his calculation.” Kerry got his wish, although not in the way he had hoped. Indeed, Assad and his allies altered their policies, effectively escalating the battle against a fractious opposition while agreeing to participate in the Geneva process. The Obama administration also modified its own calculation, accommodating Russia’s views on Geneva II even as its Syrian allies proved unwilling to organize to attend.

The decision to increase the supply of arms to the opposition is variously rationalized as a response to Russia, Iran and Hezbollah’s successes on the battlefield; as a necessary response to Syria's violation of the US “red line” on the use of chemical weapons; or as an instrument to consolidate opposition ranks around the self-described reliable and moderate forces led by Salim Idriss. The opposition, however, needs to force its way to the negotiating table not as a compliant client of third parties but as an authentically Syrian party to ending the conflict, a goal it has thus far failed to achieve. There is no reason to assume that simply adding more guns to the mix will improve matters.