In contrast to the disappointment evinced by the Israeli public, the Israel Defense Forces are now summarizing their analysis of the Pillar of Defense operation in Gaza with great satisfaction. Israel’s military views the operation as a small-scale prototype of Israel’s future wars: short, powerful, and reliant on aerial power. Evidently the IDF has extricated itself from the trauma of the Second Lebanon War (2006) failed ground maneuver and has amassed enough confidence to refrain from a ground offensive in future conflicts as well. The new deputy chief of staff, General Gadi Eizenkot, who currently seems to have the greatest chances of being appointed the next chief of staff, is a most prominent exponent of that approach.

Why does the IDF label Pillar of Defense as a “success”? Although politically the operation led to a rise in Hamas’ stature, militarily — it ushered in a peace and quiet to the Southern communities that they have not experienced in years. While high-echelon military figures are not taking any bets on the future, many of them expect the quiet in the South to extend for a long time. The IDF is still impressed by the efficiency with which the Hamas enforced the cease-fire on all the factions in Gaza — in (almost) one fell swoop.

The main achievements of Pillar of Defense [operation] were registered in the first half hour of the operation: the liquidation of Ahmed Jabari signaled that Israel is not deterred from striking at high-ranking Hamas officials. Immediately afterward, Israel’s air force destroyed 17 Iranian Fajr rockets and struck at scores of short-range rocket launching pits. Painstaking collection of intelligence facilitated the accurate hits and many in the IDF felt that it would have been possible to announce victory and conclude the operation after only 24-48 hours.

But that did not happen. The operation lasted an additional week — which many felt was pointless — while the reserve forces that were mobilized with Tzav 8 (emergency draft), readied themselves in the country’s South and waited for the command that never came. Here we still see evidence of the influence of the Second Lebanon War trauma that will evidently continue to accompany us in all future conflicts. Ever since 2006, the chief of staff will always request an extensive mobilization of the reserves in order to lay the groundwork for a land maneuver, and the political echelon will always authorize this step. This is the source for the gap that was created in the Israeli public opinion, between expectations and results: When the IDF receives authorization to call up 70,000 soldiers — more than the number of reserve soldiers called up in the Second Lebanon War, and many more soldiers than the Gaza Strip can possibly contain — this creates public expectations that Israel is readying itself to solve the Gaza problem once and for all. Meanwhile, the IDF had no intentions whatsoever to carry out an extensive ground operation in Gaza.