'Saudi Code' Prevents Arab Spring in Kingdom
Fahad Nazer writes that the "Saudi code" will prevent a repeat in the Kingdom of what took place in Egypt.
Despite the longstanding expectations of some that the Saudi regime’s days are numbered, it has survived the tumult of the “Arab Spring” relatively unscathed and is likely to endure for the foreseeable future. The unwillingness of the majority of Saudi citizens to replicate what exasperated Arabs have done elsewhere in the region stems in large measure from a combination of what some call Saudi “exceptionalism” and what I characterize as a Saudi Code. It is not fear of government reprisal, as many assume.
As a Saudi who began his career working for the government, then became loosely affiliated with two U.S.-based, Saudi-led organizations that are critical of the Saudi government, I am intimately familiar with the broad spectrum of views on the kingdom. On one end is the official narrative, which speaks of a new nation that is in the early stages of development and which has undergone many changes to meet the changing needs of its people. On the other extreme is the view which paints the Saudi regime as among the most oppressive on earth, which not only routinely violates the rights of its own citizens — especially women — but is also exporting a militant brand of Islam across the Muslim world that has led to the proliferation of extremist groups. While the former underestimates serious challenges, the latter is a distorted caricature that fails to explain why Saudis have not joined the fray of the Arab Spring.
Saudis have paid attention to the suffering of Syrians and the travails of Egyptians, Libyans and Tunisians. While they are not satisfied with the status quo, they've also gained greater appreciation for the relative stability, prosperity and, as they see it, civility of their state.
Saudis believe that they are unlike their counterparts in the Middle East; not better, just different. That also means that they do things differently. Part of the reason behind this exceptionalism stems from the kingdom’s preeminence in the Muslim world and its global importance as the world’s top oil producer. The former has made Saudis ultra-cautious when advocating for reform. The latter has led some to develop a sense of entitlement that made them reliant on government largess. For others, this healthy sense of self-worth has made them demand a bigger role in the political decision making process.
