Almost two years after the eruption of the Syrian crisis, which rapidly transformed into a bloody conflict, Syria today bears an increasing resemblance to a plane without a pilot in full flight command. Thus the whole issue becomes one of maneuvering the plane into making a safe landing once it reaches its still unknown destination. This means reaching an inclusive and widely accepted agreement at home, for the sake of the reaching the day after, regardless of the nature of that day.

This will be an agitated period, which most probably will extend in time, leading to a different, more complex kind of crisis: a situation that does not preclude more violence. In other words, if the plane crashes, it could have a dramatic effect on the passengers (i.e., Syrian citizens) and the crash site (i.e., the Arab East) alike.

Already, kidnapping and killing along sectarian lines are becoming part of the game, which suggests a Lebanonization of the conflict. One could also observe increasing sectarian tension in Iraq emanating from any political crisis, regardless of its nature, because of the internal positioning on Syria. Indeed, a main factor of the recent buildup of tension and sectarian demonstrations in Iraq is a byproduct of the fight in Syria and for Syria.

The same and more could be said about Lebanon, where the outcome of the fight in Syria would have a major effect on the existing balance of power in the already polarized Lebanese political conflict. This is a conflict between a Sunni minority, the March 14 Alliance, and a Shiite majority, the March 8 Alliance, leading the two alliances to support, through different ways, their Syrian allies while exchanging accusations of not respecting the policy of distancing themselves from the Syrian crisis.