Political dissension among the Islamists in the "Arab spring countries" did not take long to emerge once in power. They are reflected in the increasingly difficult and tense relations, the constant exchange of accusations and criticism between them. Such is clear between the Muslim Brotherhood on one hand, represented by the Egyptian freedom and justice party or the Tunisian Ennahda — despite some differences revolving around national contexts and experience — and the Salafist constituency on the other hand. Various observations can be made about these dissensions.

First, it is important to underline four general trends among Salafists. One could be considered as apolitical, focusing on the rituals, on withdrawal and minimal involvement in the public sphere, except for practical and necessary matters of daily life. Such groups tend to refuse to get involved in the mode of life of what they consider to be “a not Islamic enough society,” even if it is a Muslim society. The second trend is an anti-politics one, as politics is conceived in the "city." It is in a perpetual conflict and violent confrontation with non-Islamic societies in which it exists because the given societies do not live according to their own values. Such a trend is personified by the Salafist jihadists: they would bestow on themselves the duty and obligation to change by imposition through struggle and violence. The third trend is the interesting and new one. It is the politicized Salafist trend, which found an opportunity to grow amidst the changes brought by the revolution and the opening of the political space in the society. This is done without changing necessarily its view of the current society but changing the means to change the society, or save it, via political action. It is the trend that discovered the importance of involvement in the city life, though it often could be violent in its language and sometimes action. Engaging in political actions means forming parties and getting actively involved in different walks of the political life. The Muslim Brotherhood’s reaction to the Salafists is to try to get them on their side for electoral purposes.

The second observation on the dissension holds that the Muslim Brotherhood feels that the Salafist jihadists are a mixed blessing. They could on one hand create problems and hurt the image of Islamism and subsequently of all those associated with it. Nevertheless, they could on the other hand render the Muslim Brotherhood the most credible potential actor in the eyes of society, helping them to fight the Salafists in the name of Islam and dispossess them of the capacity to gain support in certain instances. Thus the Muslim Brotherhood becomes in the eyes of the large public even for many non-Islamists, the efficient and legitimate actor in power to curb the influence of the Salafists and thus get rid of their danger.

Third, the Salafists converted to politics are becoming increasingly frustrated and angry with the Muslim Brotherhood after striking deals and politically cooperating with them against the liberal and anti-Islamist constituency. This was done on the basis or understanding that they would share power. The latter never materialized as it ends up, and the Muslim Brotherhood have been heavily recruiting their own people into the administration and controlling the politics of the new regimes and leaving their Islamist allies with almost nothing. They were used for a free ride to power. This led to a strong reaction, as we’re witnessing in Egypt, with the Salafists distancing themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood and trying to build bridges with the secular or civilian opposition. The Salafists also benefit from a key card in their hands, which consists in profiting from the very conservative constituency in the Muslim Brotherhood that usually has political affinities and thus is open to political alliances despite ideological differences.