It has been a long time since statements by Russian officials regarding Russian-American relations have sounded as good-natured as they did after the negotiations in Moscow with US Secretary of State John Kerry. Sergey Lavrov found the American guest to be in a cooperative mood, and both sides acknowledged that his negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin were full and substantive. On the Syrian question, they spoke in unison: Peace is the only option, the conflict threatens to create a failed state, consideration should be given to the idea of convening an international conference and both Moscow and Washington are committed to the Geneva conventions and will continue to look for a solution that is acceptable to all.

Given the state of Russian-American relations in recent months, the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Israel’s interference in the conflict, compromise seems doubtful. Russia’s position is certainly not changing; for over two years now, it has held firmly to a single set of postulates, and all hope to detect movement in its approach has been in vain. Rather, it is the US that is refining its point of view — not due to Russia, but as enthusiasm wanes regarding what Syria might look like after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad leaves. Still, Kerry’s visit should be seen as highly symbolic, both for relations between Washington and Moscow and for the outlook in Syria.

With respect to Russian-American relations, the positive atmosphere is due to the fact that the agenda has become very narrow. The system that has guided this relationship for several decades has run its course. One axis of this grid was strategic military parity, and the other was ideology. Today, both of these fundamental concepts are in question. Parity still has significance as a symbol of the exclusivity of the Russian-American relationship. But the New START Treaty, ratified in 2010, was probably the last treaty of that type that continued the tradition of the 1970s and 1980s. Now, Russia does not intend to resume negotiations on arms reductions, and the reason for this is not only the American anti-missile defense program (yet another relic of the past era), but the existence of rising nuclear powers, primarily China.

Something similar is also happening with ideology. Russia no longer talks about its commitment to Western values and Obama sees no point in trying to change Russia. He has no reason to because from his perspective, Moscow plays only a supporting, albeit fairly important, role in the implementation of US foreign-policy strategy. This is the source of the reluctance to get seriously involved in the “struggle for human rights” under the banner of the Magnitsky List. The administration prefers to maintain its working relationship with Russia in order to resolve specific issues, and the White House is not interested in trying to turn the Kremlin into a like-minded ally, just as it has no plans to use criticism on issues of democracy as a battering ram in service of certain goals.