The logic of the Western Arab alliance in arming the Syrian opposition lies in need, as they see it, to establish a more balanced military situation on the ground.  This is true even though this engagement differs from one country to another and some countries have already been arming factions in the opposition.

They aim to provide a strong deterrence capacity to the opposition, to neutralize as much as possible the military superiority of the regime forces and convince them to come to the negotiating table. On the opposite side, surfing on its military victory in Qusair and the post-Qusair military drive, the Syrian government feels that three factors allow it to play in a tougher position.

One of these is the chaotic situation of the opposition, which is unable to get its act together because of its divisions. These divisions range from the idiosyncratic to the political to the ideological, and are exacerbated by the relations many cultivated with competing powers in the alliance of opposition supporters.

Second, the Western powers fear seeing a new Mali created in Syria by the increasing presence, visibility and activities of the jihadists. These concerns create some reticence among these countries that further complicates their aim of bringing down the regime. This reticence exists despite the logical argument advanced by many in the opposition that this jihadist expansion is encouraged by the absence of a serious peaceful political solution.