When the seemingly never-ending regime of Hosni Mubarak collapsed in early 2011, the lethargy of the Russian reaction surprised the world. Egypt's longtime president had never been a particular friend of Moscow's, instead remaining fully loyal to Washington. So, although there was no reason for tears at the Kremlin or Smolenskaya Square, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the current Russian establishment's general aversion to revolutions did not allow welcoming this triumph of popular will. At the time, both Western and Arab colleagues shrugged quizzically, wondering how the Russians could be so inflexible and reluctant to think about the future. The American interpretation expressed this sentiment more vividly: Russia, with its cautious attitude toward the democratic tide in the Middle East, was on the “wrong side of history.”

History is a tricky thing, however, constantly changing its “right side.” The democratically elected Islamist president was removed from power by the very same generals who, two and a half years before, had pushed aside a secular dictator. Although what took place is a classic military coup, everyone is trying to avoid those words, lest the “wrong side” be the result. And who knows what will come next. Try to guess which forces will be expressing the “people's will” six months from now.

Russian policy in a shifting Middle East is the subject of constant discussion. Does Moscow have articulated interests? What role is it playing there today? Russian policy can actually be divided into two parts: toward countries in which outside intervention may occur, and toward nations whose problems are being resolved within their own borders. (The latter is relative, of course, since any border can be penetrated, but the degree of intervention remains different.) The first category includes Libya and Syria, and the second includes Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen.

In the first instance, Russia is primarily concerned with issues related to a bedrock concept of international relations, that is, sovereignty. Moscow's retreat during the Libyan campaign from its traditional position of nonintervention, which was a surprise to everyone, was not the beginning of a new trend. To the contrary, it catalyzed the extremely firm and unyielding position to come. Regardles of the considerations that guided President Dmitry Medvedev in the decision not to block military intervention, the result only convinced everyone that such a step had been a mistake. Policy on the Syrian issue, which has not budged in more than two years, has demonstrated once and for all that no longer will it work for outside forces to decide who is “right” in a civil war and then help the “right side” win.