The equations upon which the Middle East is currently built have nothing to do with the calculations upon which traditional political analyses are made. In fact, the Arab Spring revolutions that coincided with the overwhelming sectarian tensions that prevailed in the region transformed the Middle East into a spiderweb of overlapping positions that are nearly impossible to decode.

The variety of pertinent factors affecting discussions and relations in the region make the Middle East conflict one that is completely different and much more complex than anything else, anywhere in the world. Here, we find a religious factor greatly affected by the multitude of existing sectarian entities, alongside an economic factor convolutedly intertwined with the dynamic of oil reserves, in addition to traditional political conflicts between various belligerents. The overall context of the battle between modernity and tradition also plays a role in the ongoing generalized conflict, with the social factor of tribal affiliations thrown into the mix. All these factors therefore come to play their roles in an effective manner, making the Middle East conflict an impossibly hard dilemma to discuss or approach.

Following are some examples that prove the complex nature of this spider web. While Saudi Arabia and Qatar regionally compete and disagree about the fate of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood— which was Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s worst enemy — Saudi Arabia and Qatar do, in fact, join forces against Iran and in support of the Syrian rebels, in large part composed of Muslim Brotherhood elements. Iraq’s Muslim Brotherhood also receives similar support from both the Saudis and Qataris, despite the fact that the latter two hold divergent positions in regard to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, Iran stands with Assad’s regime, which is currently being fought by Islamic factions backed by the Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine’s Hamas movement — both of which also receive backing and sponsorship from Iran. As such, Iran rejected Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule and considered it a coup against the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, Assad considered the Muslim Brotherhood’s downfall in Egypt a victory and welcomed Sisi’s initiative.

Further complicating matters, Iraq is eradicating the Baathists’ influence in the country, yet it is accused of supporting those same Baathists in Syria. Iraq itself, which has close ties with Iran, disagrees with Tehran about Egypt and backs the military over the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, Baghdad’s position converges with that of Saudi Arabia, with which it has quite unfriendly relations, and, in this regard, adopts a position contrasting with that of its main backer, Washington. On yet another level, Arab Gulf states are considered some of the United States’ most trusted friends in the region, and agree with Washington in backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria — yet they disagree with the Americans on the subject of Egypt and Iraq. The United States, on the other hand, disagrees with Iran on almost everything, but it and Tehran espouse the same position rejecting the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and are in favor of the current Iraqi government. In addition, Turkey has excellent relations with Arab Gulf states and contributes with them toward the overthrow of Assad, but disagrees with them about Egypt. In the same context, Turkey, despite its disagreement with Iran about the latter’s support for Assad, helps Tehran overcome the internationally imposed sanctions.