As the dust begins to settle after Egypt’s third constitutional referendum in three years, this time passing what are officially constitutional amendments but in reality is a brand new constitution, two broad narratives are emerging. The first narrative, predominantly local, positively presents the totality of everything that is taking place in regard to the vote and the country, a triumph for the goal of real democracy and the values of modernism. The second narrative proclaims the death of democracy and the end of everything that has to do with the January 25 Revolution and its lofty goals. The reality, one leans to believe, is more complex and multilayered. It is also still developing, most obviously.

Let's start with some basic facts and figures. Official overall voter turnout in the 2012 parliamentary elections stood at 54%, while voter turnout for the 2012 presidential elections was 46.4% in the first round and 52% in the second. The 2011 constitutional referendum, which came at the height of post-revolution national enthusiasm, witnessed a turnout of just over 41%. Most importantly and tellingly, at the time of the 2012 constitutional referendum — which saw a large-scale mobilization on both sides of the political fray and heated campaigns in favor of and against the charter — the total turnout only reached just over 32%, with 36% of voters casting a "no" vote. In the 2014 referendum, official voter turnout figures stood at 38.6% (thus somewhat higher than the 2012 referendum turnout), which culminated into what was simultaneously an odd sounding and resounding support percentage of 98.1%.

Two things come to mind. First, while some make the argument that voter turnout was low compared to other referendum results, the turnout was actually substantial and sufficiently reassuring for the authorities in particular. Second, while some automatically assumed rigging and fraud given the ostensibly high-approval percentage, there has not been any real evidence of something earth-shattering thus far. Instead, this figure of unanimity was also the result of the boycott of the naysayers, predominantly by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters as well as some degree of boycott by non-Brotherhood sympathizers who object Egypt's current state of affairs. There was also a tremendously omnipresent “vote yes” campaign, while no clear “vote no” campaign saw the light of day, whether out of lack of initiative or lack of allowed space, if not potentially a bit a both.

Four particular phenomena have been discussed in the media regarding the referendum. The first is what is regarded as a high turnout by women, while the second are the seemingly honest manifestations — at least if in part — of jubilation and festivities in the voting lines, often with nationalist and pro-army music playing in the background. The third phenomenon, and a particularly comforting sign, was the absence of process-derailing violence. The fourth, and a point of much contention, is an allegedly low turnout by youths. While to my knowledge there are no exact statistics or exit polls on the turnout breakdown, the prominent media discussion of the alleged low youth turnout as some incontestable fact — especially given how the media has strongly been in support of the current transition and process — suggests that there is at least some smoke, even if not necessarily an outright fire.