During his Jan. 6 visit to Pakistan, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal celebrated the "deep-rooted historic relations between the two Islamic countries" and promised regular consultation meetings on regional and international issues of mutual concern. The promise of Saudi investment, together with remittances of around 1.5 million Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia are much needed in Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia thinks its domination in the Arab world may benefit from close partnership and consultation with Pakistan. Some observers may think that Saudi's intention to establish a Riyadh-based Gulf military force for the sole purpose of containing Iran may be the main reason for Faisal’s visit to Islamabad. But this is not the only reason. Pakistani military assistance is not new in Saudi Arabia or the rest of the Gulf. It may be reliable, subservient, less controversial and cheaper than assistance from other sources. Above all, it is purely contractual and lacks the political strings that are often attached to military assistance. 

Yet, Saudi Arabia may be seeking Pakistani security assistance for domestic rather than external threats. Given that Pakistanis share Islam with their Saudi partners, Pakistani troops can be deployed in religious sites without the Saudi regime being criticized for inviting infidels to defend the land of the two holy mosques. Pakistan needs the income and has the manpower and the expertise, while Saudi Arabia can be assured that no Pakistani hidden agendas or grandiose rival projects undermine the relationship. It can rely on Pakistani troops in times of crisis, specially internal ones. But it is unlikely that Pakistan will be of great help in the instance of a future Saudi-Iranian confrontation, which is highly unlikely at present.

Partnership with Pakistan satisfies the Saudi historic quest for a close non-Arab ally to maintain its hegemony in the Arab world and deal with its own internal security challenges. It is ironic that both hegemony in the Arab world and dealing with internal crises are better served as a result of close ties with non-Arabs. In North Africa, Egypt and Morocco were both potential and real Saudi allies. Saudi Arabia tried to incorporate Morocco into the Gulf Cooperation Council as a privileged non-Gulf member, but Gulf states resisted, and Morocco itself did not express enthusiasm.