Within about 24 hours last week, Russian officials supported UN Security Council Resolution 2139 on humanitarian access in Syria and refused to sign a political agreement between ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and three of his political opponents. (The Russian representative, Vladimir Lukin, would have signed as a witness, alongside three EU foreign ministers, not as a party to the deal.) Taking into account Moscow’s long-standing position on Syria’s civil war — that it supports a Syrian-led political settlement — this may look puzzling on the surface, in that Ukrainians appeared to have reached a settlement of their own. 

Nevertheless, it reflects key differences in Moscow’s assessments of the two crises, with important implications. There may also be significant practical linkages between these otherwise distant events.

For those focused on Syria’s tragic civil war and Russia’s role in it, geography is the obvious critical distinction between Ukraine and Syria. Ukraine is Russia’s neighbor, and Syria is not. When combined with resulting historical, cultural, social and economic ties, Ukraine’s future is an existential or near-existential matter for Russia — and Syria’s is not. Accordingly, the mere fact that Ukraine’s government and top opposition leaders had found acceptable terms was not enough for Moscow. (Nor was it enough for protesters on the Maidan, who could not be satisfied so long as Yanukovych remained in power.)

In the short-term, Ukraine’s importance to Russia means that the continuing crisis could rapidly become all-consuming for Russian government officials. It is not a problem for the Foreign Ministry alone — it draws in government ministers overseeing trade and finance, customs and border controls, energy and a host of other issues. Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and senior generals are in on the act too, directing snap military readiness exercises.