UAE likely to support Egypt for long haul
It's in the UAE's interests for Egypt to stabilize, and it will continue to offer unconditional support to Cairo until that objective is met.
In the years before the establishment of the federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971, a number of Arab Islamists flocked to what would be the new country, as functionaries in government, particularly in education and the judiciary. Foremost among them were Egyptians, who saw better economic opportunities in the UAE than in Egypt, and were also fleeing from anti-Muslim Brotherhood crackdowns under President Gamal Abdel Nasser. That impact upon the Emirati educational system was substantial — and socially, that period created the impetus for the formation in the newly created UAE of al-Islah, an Islamist group of Emiratis that was closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
That sort of “honeymoon period” drew to a close in the 1990s, as Emirati authorities began to become uncomfortable with the rhetoric and social program of al-Islah. The group remained legal, but its upward mobility was stunted as the authorities became more suspicious of it. Egyptians continued to migrate to the UAE, as did other Arab nationalities, but Brotherhood activity within the UAE beyond al-Islah was slowly restricted to study circles among Arab expatriates.
The 9/11 attacks in the United States, in which two Emiratis were identified as having been involved, was a turning point that intensified the anti-Islamist feeling within the state. That shook Abu Dhabi significantly, and soon thereafter, a decision (according to private discussions with UAE officials at the time) was taken to intensify the sidelining of any Islamist presence within the country. Government officials in educational institutions or involved in religious affairs and in other sectors were either reassigned or dismissed, if they were deemed to have sympathies with or promoted Brotherhood ideology or Salafism.
The Arab uprisings took the UAE, as they did everyone else, by surprise. Unenthusiastic about the January 25 Revolution in Egypt, the Abu Dhabi establishment feared the toppling of Hosni Mubarak would lead to an empowerment of Islamism in Egypt. That would then have significant repercussions for the strength of Islamist groups elsewhere, due to the substantial influence that Egypt has in the Arab world.
