Seyed Hossein Mousavian, in an Al-Monitor article on July 31, argued for a total revamping of the geopolitics of the Middle East including closing the Iranian nuclear dossier “in the shortest time possible,” to set the stage for establishing a bilateral US-Iran dialogue to address severe regional crises. By signing a nuclear deal with Iran, the paths to US-Iranian cooperation would open, which would ostensibly enable them first and foremost to coordinate their fight against radical Sunni jihadism wreaking havoc in Syria and Iraq.

But what sort of US-Iranian cooperation does Mousavian suggest, and why should we expect it to improve in the wake of a nuclear deal, especially if that deal involves excessive concessions by the P5+1? More fundamentally, from a US point of view, why is this cooperation even necessary or desirable?

The added value of US-Iranian cooperation is not self-evident. Both states have an incentive to fight Sunni jihadists, and both are likely to do so regardless of what the other does. If anything, Iran’s incentive to take on radicals amassing at its border is far greater than America’s. For the United States, the Syrian-Iraqi theater is one among many in the war against terror. But for Iran, chaos in Iraq poses a supreme risk to its national security. A scenario in which Sunni radicals set up camp near Iran's western border could import longstanding sectarian feuds close to the heart of Iranian population centers.

The Iranian regime for decades has been planting violent proxies throughout the Middle East, provoking war and promoting extremist ideologies. US policymakers might wish for limited cooperation with Iran, of the sort Mousavian and some other pundits encourage, but such cooperation would risk boosting the entire Iranian proxy network, already emboldened by an Iranian patron with nuclear threshold status.