Does Moscow understand American objectives in the Middle East? Amid turmoil in the region, and after President Barack Obama's declaration of his determination to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State (IS), the answer matters — even more so since Russia often defines itself relative to the United States.

Obama’s commitment to expanding air attacks against IS militants and assembling a coalition to combat the group certainly raises the stakes for Russia in the Middle East. Washington has not used force in the region (or anywhere else) to this extent since its support for and ultimately leadership of the 2011 effort to oust former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. Moreover, the United States' record suggests that whatever Obama might say now, he could well broaden and deepen the military’s role in the future, with potentially grave consequences for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

The central question for Russian officials is: Whether, when and how the United States might do more than it has so far announced? This is where Obama’s intent enters the picture.

Unfortunately, some Russian commentary on US aims and capabilities seems bizarrely detached from reality. For example, Alexander Nekrassov, who identifies himself as a former presidential and government adviser and appears to present officially sanctioned perspectives, recently wrote, “In the opinion of Russian experts, [Israel’s intervention in Gaza] looked more like a smokescreen for US failures in Iraq and Libya rather than an attempt to wipe out Hamas’ arsenal and top commanders.” Nekrassov does not explain how the fighting in Gaza would accomplish this or, more importantly, how the United States would persuade Israeli leaders to subject themselves to international condemnation, commit their armed forces to combat and expose their civilians to retaliatory attacks to create a rather short-lived “smokescreen.”