KHARTOUM, Sudan — ‪Increasingly, Sudan appears to be assuming greater space in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. Last year, Sudanese warplanes and troops joined the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Moreover, Sudan is the only country, besides Bahrain, which has joined Saudi Arabia in recently cutting diplomatic relations with Iran. This followed the attacks on Saudi diplomatic compounds in Iran after the execution of Saudi Shiite Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Of further note, Riyad's announcement‪ of a 34-member coalition against the Islamic State includes Sudan, which as recently as 2013 saw its President Omar al-Bashir banned from flying over Saudi airspace en route to Iran. While the “Islamic Coalition” is not a military alliance, Khartoum’s involvement in Yemen effectively makes it a military partner of Riyadh, cooperation for which it has reportedly received $2.2 billon.

Mindful of the above, has Sudan really gone pro-Saudi? Or is it just increasingly anti-Shiite?

Sudan’s acceptance of Saudi Arabia’s “cold hard cash,” as one report describes it, does not in itself signal a fundamental change in Sudan’s political orientation. Indeed, while the sensational political shift toward Riyadh is new, Saudi investment in Sudan is not. The Saudis have long been the biggest single investors in Sudan, having pumped an estimated $11 billion into the country — and particularly in agriculture. For instance, almost all of Sudan’s sheep and mutton exports go to Saudi Arabia, one of the reasons why sheep is exorbitantly expensive for Sudanese — even in rural areas, where an animal goes for some $200.

Sudanese moves against Shiite political power in the region also suggest that there is more to Khartoum’s repositioning in its foreign policy than just the lure of petrodollars from abroad. The Islamic Coalition initiative has already been criticized for ignoring the Shiite and Shiite-related elements of the regional political structure — for instance, excluding both Iraq and Syria apparently due to their close ties to Iran. In this vein, it should be borne in mind that the Saudi-led war in Yemen is also widely seen as a proxy war against Shiite Iran and its allies. For Sudan, this endorsement of — and participation in — efforts to freeze out Iran is new. Until recently, Tehran and Khartoum had maintained good relations for decades, particularly in the field of weapons trade and the exchange of armaments more generally. Commenting on this, and the Sudanese government’s simultaneous closure of Iranian centers and cultural institutes, Yassin Ibrahim of the University of Al-Nileen in Khartoum told Al-Monitor, “[The government] wants to stop the spread of Shiism.”