Speculations over increased Russian military presence in Libya entailed a new round of debate over Russia’s goals in the Middle East North Africa region. As Al-Monitor reported last week, the report by the British tabloid The Sun also triggered controversies within Russia over whether going into Libya is in the country’s best national interests. Moreover, the rumors run in conflict with previous public statements made by Russian officials at all levels. So it really is important to have the facts straight.

In recent months, government structures controlled by the Chamber of Representatives and patronized by the Libyan National Army from Tobruk had requested that Russia provide them with additional financial aid, which the state administration needs to operate state agencies on the territories under its authority. Considering that Tripoli and Tobruk administrations are involved in a constant confrontation, the Chamber of Representatives barely manages to meet the basic daily needs of the population in the areas it controls and maintain the administrative structures. One of these urgent problems is a cash deficit. The quantity of cash circulating among individuals and companies (both private and state-owned) is limited, and further money issuance is impossible as the Central Bank and the Mint of Libya are based in Tripoli. Russia has already provided such aid, acknowledging the legitimacy of the Chamber of Representatives and its status as the sole legislative institution of Libya. However, the support is strictly non-military; it is supposed to relieve the suffering of civilians in the war-torn country. This is the reason Russia has increased food supplies to the country in recent years — to help the nation resist economic setbacks and their negative impacts on the population.

In spite of the ongoing crisis, several Russian companies either continue to work in Libya or are just returning there now. Some of them indeed rely on private security services to ensure the safety of their staff and property as much as numerous foreign nongovernmental organizations and enterprises do. Some of the mercenary security officers are native Russian speakers and current or former citizens of post-Soviet nations. This is a type of private business that — regardless of being risky — provides large incomes. The security officers represent and protect the interests of their clients, the list of which does not include the Russian government. Moreover, even Russian diplomats do not use the services of private security and military companies to ensure their safety while visiting Libya. In this respect, it should be reminded that the staff of the Russian Embassy in Libya left the country in 2013 to re-establish a downsized presence in Tunisia. Thus, one should distinguish Russian professional soldiers who are absent in Libya and private security guards who speak Russian but work for particular individuals and do not officially represent their countries.

Although the embargo on military supplies to Libya imposed Feb. 26, 2011, by the UN Security Council still exists, weaponry and equipment constantly enter the country in quantities sufficient for local fighting. This flow includes, among others, weapons from ex-Soviet countries and Eastern Europe as a whole — mostly outdated models from the Soviet era or their equivalents supplied to Libya by private dealers and paid for by interested sponsors such as Libyan diaspora entrepreneurs and “charity foundation” keepers from Europe and Gulf states. As these deals involve Russian-speaking nationals of Eastern European countries, they can be seen as agents of Russian influence, which is far from the truth. In reality, the businesspeople of this kind gather around every long-term armed conflict of the modern-day world, completely lacking political bias toward any side of the confrontation in Libya and merely looking for a financial benefit.