What can be expected from the annual Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit being held on Dec. 9 in Saudi Arabia? Many are wondering if, or how, this month’s summit will differ from the last one held a year ago in Kuwait. Although difficult to predict how the upcoming meeting will unfold, recent statements from Arab Gulf states’ officials indicate that neither side has the will to make major concessions, at least in the foreseeable future. To the contrary, the attitudes expressed by both sides suggest that the GCC crisis could last for a long time.

Earlier this month, shortly after Qatar announced its decision to exit OPEC effective Jan. 1, 2019, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa called the Qatar crisis “unprecedented and very deep.” He accused Doha of eliminating any hope of Qatar returning to the Saudi/Emirati-led bloc’s fold. Regarding the summit, he said the “dispute can’t be solved by just a hug. There must be a new agreement and new regime, and Doha should be placed under scrutiny.” Despite Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud inviting the emir of Qatar to the summit earlier this month, Manama’s chief diplomat affirmed that Qatar had burned its bridges with the GCC’s blockading states and Doha sending Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani or a low-level representative would make no difference.

None of this bodes well for pushing the Arab Gulf states toward reconciliation. As the GCC is unquestionably at its most dysfunctional stage since the sub-regional institution’s founding in 1981, it is difficult to imagine the summit resulting in the Arab Gulf monarchies resolving their 18-month-old dispute. But even if the parties fail to overcome their differences and the meeting does not result in the blockade being lifted along with diplomatic relations being restored, there is still no reason to conclude that such a "failed" summit would necessarily mark the GCC’s death knell.

Changes in leadership and regional circumstances could, at least at some point, restore the GCC’s relevance, which the institution had from 1981 to 2017. Perhaps one reason Qatar has thus far chosen to stay in the GCC despite the crisis pertains to hopes that the leadership in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi might not be in power as long as many expect. Given that the dispute is highly personalized, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman or Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nayhan losing power — even if not any time soon — is a scenario that could possibly make a Qatari-Saudi or a Qatari-Emirati rapprochement possible. Yet with both crown princes remaining at the helm of Riyadh's and Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy agendas, it would be difficult to imagine the emir of Qatar making overtures to either leader given that they sought his overthrow in 2017 and sieged his country despite Qatar being a founding GCC member and ally in the Yemen war.