Recent contacts between the leaderships of Russia and the United States at the G-20 summit in Osaka and the tripartite Israel-Russia-United States national security meeting in Jerusalem were followed by dynamic “diplomatic traffic” in Damascus.

Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi arrived in Syria July 7; UN envoy Geir Pedersen paid a two-day visit to Damascus July 9-10; Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, arrived July 12; and foreign affairs aide to the chair of Iran's parliament, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with President Bashar al-Assad July 16. All discussed the fate of Syria’s constitutional reforms and the country’s economic reconstruction.

Despite heated public rhetoric and US sanctions on Russia, both Washington and Moscow are seeking mutually appropriate modalities and modes of coordination in Syria. This reflects the Donald Trump administration’s obsession with deterring Iran and securing Israel’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The latter include:

• Hindering Tehran’s plans to build a land logistics bridge between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon via Iraq and Syria (using the Iran-run Abu Kamal checkpoint on the Iraqi-Syrian border).
• Opposing Iran’s tactics to keep a military presence in southern Syria, adjacent to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
• Torpedoing Tehran’s attempts to develop economic projects, as well as to build or control the critical infrastructure in coastal Syria, allegedly with an eye on supporting Hezbollah, and under the de facto air cover of local Russian military facilities.
• Upsetting Iran’s hidden attempts to influence the political process in Syria, especially the future constitutional reform under the UN umbrella, via egging on Damascus to stand still on possible concessions.
• Confronting Tehran’s efforts to convert its military presence on the ground in central Syria, both directly or through loyal militias, into long-term economic dominance across the country, demanding exclusive conditions for Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked companies to participate in Syria’s economic reconstruction.

These ambitions imply efforts to create partnerships with prominent Syrian private entrepreneurs from the newly emerged elite business group in such spheres as mineral resources, construction, agriculture, general trade, transport and information technology.