Turkey has gained ample experience in organizing, training, equipping and using armed militants in Syria since it forayed into the theater of war in 2016. Various groups at odds with each have come under Turkish control under the banner of the Syrian National Army (SNA). Yet Turkey’s efforts to end rifts between armed groups in Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in Syria, and merge them into an organized army are failing.

Turkey has assumed commitments to eliminate terrorist groups under the Astana, Sochi and Moscow accords with Russia. Its efforts thus far have been aimed at reshaping armed factions in a bid to repel Russian pressure and stave off regime offensives in the region. Most importantly, it has sought to transform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a UN-designated terrorist organization and the dominant outfit in Idlib. The options of rebranding or dissolving the group have been floated in the past, but lately, Turkish intelligence has been pushing for a joint military council between HTS, the SNA and the National Liberation Front (NLF).

HTS, for its part, has followed a policy aimed at sustaining its dominant position in Idlib. First, it has been careful to stay on good terms with Turkey. Second, it has sought to lure the NLF, which involves Islamist groups, to its side. Third, it has been trying to present itself as a local force opposed to the regime without any ambitions beyond Syria. And fourth, it has sought to suppress rival al-Qaeda-linked groups, thus appearing as a force clamping down on radicals.

The control of SNA factions, which have backed the three Turkish military campaigns in northern Syria, has been relatively easy for Turkey, though controlling the rebels has not meant keeping them from committing crimes such as looting, abduction and extortion. Yet securing the unconditional loyalty of factions in the NLF, formed with Turkish backing in 2018, has proved an uphill task, not to mention that of HTS. Above all, the factions differ ideologically.