On Jan. 5 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) signed a "solidarity and stability" agreement during the annual GCC summit in Saudi Arabia. In short order, the GCC member states that had taken part in the blockade of Qatar took several important steps to implement the new agreement, inspiring confidence that the arrangement would resolve the dispute. Saudi Arabia lead the way, with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt lifting their three-year illegal boycott of Qatar in exchange for Doha agreeing to freeze legal actions against them. But there still is a very long way to go. 

While official details of the agreement have not been released, it appears the quartet may have dropped or at least suspended for now its initial 13 demands that included Qatar having to shut down Al Jazeera, end its relations with Iran, close Turkey’s military base in Doha and end its military cooperation with Ankara. These early steps seem promising, but only time will tell if the bargain reflects a possible true reconciliation that settles long-standing disagreements among these GCC states — or if the agreement is simply a face-saving measure allowing all parties to return to the occasionally tense state of affairs prior to the embargo and the threat of an invasion of Qatar.

Relations between Qatar and the sponsor of the new agreement, Saudi Arabia, appear to be recovering fastest. Indeed, rumors of shared economic and financial interests may spur the two countries to new forms of cooperation. The ties between Qatar and the UAE and Egypt, however, will likely take longer to improve. Due to long-standing mistrust and disagreements, particularly as relates to Qatar’s support to the Muslim Brotherhood, relations with both the UAE and Egypt can be fairly characterized by wariness and skepticism. 

Arguably the biggest obstacle to Gulf reconciliation — to the extent the countries were ever united in the past on core foreign policy objectives — is Qatar’s unwillingness to compromise on its relations with Tehran and Ankara. Only one day after the deal was signed, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani reminded observers that Qatar’s bilateral relations will remain its own sovereign decision. He later urged Gulf nations to enter into a dialogue with Iran and offered to broker negotiations between the GCC and Tehran. Unsurprisingly, Qatar’s bilateral relations and economic ties with both Turkey and Iran improved after the blockade was imposed. One reason for the increased contacts with Iran was because Qatar was forced to fly through Iranian airspace after Qatar's other neighbors had blocked use of theirs; this essentially forced Qatar to negotiate with Iran over Qatar's right to fly from its own airports.