Two May 30 reports on Iran’s nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) paint a dire picture. Iran has now produced over 43 kilograms of 60% highly enriched uranium (HEU). This is enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon if further enriched to 90%, a process that could take just a couple of weeks. Iran’s “breakout” time is thus below the margin of error for timely detection.  

While it would take Iran several more months to fashion the HEU into a crude weapon, and perhaps two years to mount it on a missile, fissile material production is typically considered to be the long pole in making nuclear weapons — both the most visible and the most time-consuming step. For Iran, producing weapons-grade HEU is now the shortest pole.  

Such a compression of the timeline is due to a fateful folly. The 2015 nuclear accord known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) set conditions designed to keep Iran’s breakout period to at least 12 months for about a dozen years, with the possibility of a negotiated extension. Former President Donald Trump and those who encouraged him to withdraw from the deal four years ago even though Iran was fully honoring its commitments bear the blame. Not to excuse Iran’s violation of its own commitments, but it was a predictable response to Trump’s deal-breaking.   

Exacerbating the now minuscule breakout time is Iran’s reduced cooperation with IAEA inspections. Iran still allows IAEA access to its enrichment plants and other declared nuclear facilities as required by the standard safeguards agreement called for in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). No longer allowed, however, are any of the more intrusive and frequent inspections negotiated in the JCPOA.