Sharaa-Trump meeting a mixed bag for China

➡️ China’s security concerns: The TIP factor 

The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and abundance of foreign Jihadist fighters within Syria remain main source of Beijing’s discomfort toward the Sharaa government. Both issues have not been resolved during the visit. TIP, composed largely of Chinese Uyghur militants, established a strong foothold in northern Syria during the civil war. It aligned tactically with local Islamist factions, embedding itself in Idlib and parts of Latakia.

TIP’s aim is to establish an Islamic state in China’s Xinjiang region and across Central Asia. According to War on the Rocks, an estimated 2,000-5,000 TIP fighters have entered Syria over the past 13 years, many via Afghanistan and Turkey.

Sharaa has been reluctant to rein in HTS’ foreign fighters despite pressure from the United States and Turkey. Sharaa’s political ascent is tightly bound to these dynamics. Although he has publicly disavowed TIP’s external agenda, several figures in his Islamist-leaning coalition maintain historical ties or ideological sympathies with these networks. Beijing sees this as a dual risk: the possibility of TIP reconstituting as a safe haven within Syria, and the perception that Sharaa’s brand of “national Islamism” could complicate cooperation on counter-extremism.

Specifically regarding the Uyghurs, three TIP members were promoted by Sharaa’s government early in the transition — one to brigadier general and two to colonel.

➡️ A calculated UN abstention

On the eve of the meeting, China became the sole member to abstain on Friday from a United Nations Security Council vote to remove Sharaa from the international terrorist designation. The decision balanced pragmatic recognition of Syria’s stabilization under Sharaa against anxiety over hosting militants who once fought under anti-Chinese banners.

By abstaining and not vetoing, Beijing preserved diplomatic space while signaling to Washington and Moscow that it still considered security — not ideology — a key priority in its Syria interests. 

➡️ Economic opportunity beneath the friction

Still, the same meeting that aligned Damascus with Washington may open economic doors for China. As Sam Wendel writes, Sharaa’s charm offensive, his stated commitment to market liberalization and his outreach to multiple partners, including a planned visit by Foreign Minister Asaad Shibani to Beijing, suggest a transactional, nonideological approach to reconstruction.

If Iraq is any example, China could quietly deepen engagement in Syria through economic channels aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative. Infrastructure rehabilitation in ports, rail and energy corridors — currently under Western sanctions review — would offer Beijing potential footholds in the eastern Mediterranean.

China has become a major investor in postwar Iraq, especially in the oil and infrastructure sectors. Chinese companies now manage about 34% of Iraq’s proven oil reserves and control two-thirds of its current production, with direct stakes in around 24 billion barrels of reserves. The key hurdle to invest fully in Syria for China remains sanctions.

For economic openness to take place, US sanctions have to be completely lifted, including the Caesar Act in Congress. On Monday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a waiver suspending those sanctions for another 180 days.

➡️ China's dilemma

Beijing faces complexities in addressing Syria. On one side, TIP’s lingering presence and Sharaa’s ambiguous stance toward Islamist politics raise red flags. On the other, the normalization of Damascus’ relations with the United States offers a predictable environment in which to pursue economic integration — without risk of sanctions.

For now, the Chinese approach is likely to remain one of cautious duality: diplomatically reserved but economically opportunistic until the security challenges are addressed by Damascus.