Can The Political Crisis In Egypt Actually Be Resolved?
Bassem Sabry outlines the program for a political dialogue in Egypt, but the steps required would involve compromises by both President Mohammed Morsi and the opposition.
The background has become almost like a stump paragraph in all articles about Egypt.
There is a choking economy, the state is running out of currency reserves, an increasingly unpopular government is strapped for cash to cover public spending, both President Mohammed Morsi and the MB on one hand, as well as even the opposition on the other, are growing more unpopular; the army appears to be sending vague messages that instability would not be tolerated (especially after rumors floated that Morsi would potentially sack Defense Minister Gen. Abdul Fatah El-Sisi); the judiciary remains on high alert after its recent confrontation with Morsi and Islamists protests continue to rock the country; civil disobedience in Port Said was a big surprise to the nation and a shock to Morsi, the interior ministry is being engulfed in more and more controversy involving the excessive use of force and alleged torture and abuse; and, a regrettably more and more familiar list goes on.
While the roots of the current Egyptian political crisis are manifold and the solution is consequently nothing but straightforward and immediate, it is generally assumed that if the opposition National Salvation Front (NSF) and the Islamists (mainly Morsi, the Brotherhood and the Salafist Al-Nour party) could actually manage to work out a comprehensive political deal that would both be satisfactory to their organizational and popular bases and resolve some of the more major reasons behind the current deadlock, then at least the general downward spiral could be stemmed. And with the political gridlock taken out of the picture, the country could perhaps stabilize enough for the suffering economy to get back on track.
With the exception of two reported meetings between the NSF figures and FJP Chairman Saad El-Katatny, though apparently in individual rather than official capacities, the opposition continues to refuse to sit down for dialogue or enter the upcoming parliamentary elections until a set of debatable preconditions are met, the reasoning being to show that — unlike what they argue to have not been the case before — there is a seriousness to solving to crisis and a willingness to compromise by the Brotherhood and the President.
