The Military Cannot Save Egypt
Nervana Mahmoud weighs speculation about a military intervention in Egyptian politics.
The political news from Egypt has been dominated by reports of tensions between the powerful military and the country’s Islamist leaders, with news recently leaking that the Supreme Council of Military Forces (SCAF) has been meeting without President Mohammed Morsi to discuss the ongoing political crisis. Cairo is rife with rumors, speculation, and endless debate among the public as well as the political elite about how the military will react to the current turmoil, particularly if the situation escalates and results in more uncontrolled violence and chaos. It seems that many are considering “some sort of intervention” to be almost inevitable at some stage in the future.
Since the election of President Morsi and his surprise firing of Defense Minister Husain Tantawi, the military, with its new leader, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, has adopted a well-crafted policy of watching closely from a distance and inserting itself only when deemed absolutely necessary. Al-Sissi, who was initially considered to be the Muslim Brotherhood's man in the army, has proven to be a man who speaks his mind. He is endorsed by his soldiers and is not shy about vetoing ideas he perceives as inappropriate or dangerous to Egypt’s national interest (at least from his perspective). The ministerial decree turning Egypt's border with Israel and the Gaza Strip into a five-kilometer-deep closed military zone and flooding the Gaza smuggling tunnels are just two examples.
So what’s next? What if uncontrolled violence erupts? Will the army remain neutral? The options available to the army are not as numerous as many assume. Each has its own risks and dangers and a good chance of failing.
The military's first option involves the leadership trying to prevent a downward spiral of violence through closed-door negotiations to force some sort of consensus — but this failed when attempted repeatedly by SCAF following the departure of former president Hosni Mubarak. Some may argue that al-Sissi can do a better job than Tantawi and Sami Annan, but judging by the military's efforts following Morsi’s November edict and the luncheon invitation extended to the opposition — but allegedly rejected by the president — it is doubtful that al-Sissi can reconcile the irreconcilable. The window of consensus seems to be closing fast.
