Why Only Democracy Can Save Egypt

During the army’s Sinai Liberation Day celebrations on April 28, an ensemble of Arab singers stood on stage to receive a standing ovation for their performances. Some in the crowd roared the famous chant “The army and the people are one hand!” Later, army head Gen. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, came forward to speak as scheduled. El-Sisi embarked on a passionate portrayal of the army and Egypt, and how both will remain strong and defiant, during which he got several ovations.

Suddenly, well-known singer Mohammed Fouad, who had earlier produced an Egyptian flag with the army's emblem, interrupted and emotionally pleaded to El-Sisi, “Please take care of Egypt, sir.” Fouad then began to tear up as someone began to calm him down, and a few other stars on the stage visibly began to tear up as well. The attendance reacted with strong applause to Fouad. While some understandably criticized Fouad claiming he was just acting. However,  at least to me, his emotions seemed largely sincere, and possibly captured those of a lot of people. 

The general feeling right now in much of Egypt and for many of the regular and omnipresent non-Islamist faces in punditry is a visibly much more worried sentiment toward the Muslim Brotherhood and President Mohammed Morsi, especially as organized and street opposition seems fainter. For some, they are even terrified. In their view, the Brotherhood and Morsi are not (or no longer) just a political party with whom they will mainly battle over health care and economic policy and such, and engage in democratic transfers of power. Rather, they see the current rulers as determined to take over Egypt, in a manner even worse than that of the former regime and using any means possible, including potentially rigging the elections if they must. The Brotherhood, the claims go, surely has a plan to turn Egypt into a Sunni version of Iran, a terrifying thought to many. More immediately, Morsi and the Brotherhood are seen as mismanaging the country, particularly the economy. While some of these claims at times seem somewhat hyperbolic, assumptive or premature, or contain inaccuracies, others are not entirely without at least some root cause, and increasingly so as of late. 

Given the increasingly lackluster performance of the Egyptian opposition, the hopes of many turned toward the army and its quasi-enigmatic leader Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. El-Sisi’s public image has gradually changed from being seen months ago as a potential Brotherhood ally to now being seen more as an independent military man, one who is closer to the traditional nationalist school that has long dominated the military. Between heated media commentary and even a number of citizens signing legal proxies to the army asking it to take over power over the past few months, significant public pressure seemed to be mounting on the army to just “do something” about the perceived threat of the Brotherhood. That something, for many, was to actually take over power once again.