It’s finally official. Mossad Director Yossi Cohen announced at the Herzliya Conference that there was a one-time window of opportunity to reach a comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East. Peace is no longer relegated to being the dream of various naive individuals; it is the professional assessment of a special unit in the Mossad, charged with identifying diplomatic opportunities. This information was made public by Cohen, a Netanyahu appointee, who served as head of the National Security Council before being named director of the Mossad by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself.

For the past few years, Cohen has also served as Netanyahu's unofficial foreign minister. The fact that he chose to say what he did means that he no longer wants to settle for echoing his boss. Netanyahu appoints people who meet a certain profile, but he is unable to clone them and turn them into doubles of himself. Over time, most of them turn out to be people with something to say. Some even disagree with Netanyahu and criticize him publicly. It is quite possible that the director of the Mossad will be joining that select group.

On the face of it, Cohen’s analysis highlights the prime minister’s achievements. These include his close relationship with the Donald Trump administration, his frequent meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the partial restoration of diplomatic ties with the Gulf states and Netanyahu’s contribution to creating opposition to Iran as a common denominator among Israel’s neighbors. All of this has led to the emergence of a new situation. In more practical terms, however, he seems to be calling out a challenge. What Cohen is effectively saying is that Israel is faced with an opportunity that it could miss, and that Israel is not taking advantage of the current circumstances to achieve a comprehensive peace.

It should be obvious that Israel is facing an exceptional opportunity. There have been sweeping changes in the Arab world, while opposition to Israel’s very existence has all but been eliminated with the release of the Arab League’s 2002 peace initiative. That initiative determined that the Arab — and Muslim — world would recognize Israel and establish normal relations with it, if it reaches a peace agreement with the Palestinians. The problem is that every Israeli government since then has allowed this opportunity to elude it. Then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon managed to dilute the importance of the Arab League’s decision, and none of the prime ministers who succeeded him was willing to engage in peace negotiations based on the Arab League’s initiative. While the growing Iranian threat made the decision even more relevant, improved relationships with the Gulf states, much like closer relationships with the superpowers, were taken in a totally different direction.