TASS added that the terms of the agreement outline that the base is “defensive” and “not aimed at other countries.” In return, Russia would provide Sudan with weapons and military equipment as well as training for the Sudanese military.
Since its signing, the agreement has stood on shaky ground as it awaits formal ratification from the Sudanese government, which has been in crisis since the beginning of the country's civil war in 2023.
Background: Located on Sudan's east coast, with access to the Red Sea, a base in Port Sudan would allow Russia key access to a global maritime route. Over the past decade, various powers have scrambled for access to Sudan's Red Sea coastline. In 2021, a Chinese-built port, Haidob, just 80 kilometers south of Port Sudan became operational. However, the port has remained shut since 2022 due to protests and subsequent instability. In November of 2024, Sudan scrapped a $6 billion Red Sea port deal with the UAE, citing Emirati support for paramilitary groups in the ongoing civil war.
Sudanese leaders since 2020 have dragged their feet on the Russian port deal, particularly due to Russia’s inconsistent support during Sudan’s civil war. In the first years of the war Russia maintained a relationship with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary group the Rapid Support Forces, reportedly funneling weapons to them through Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group. Yet Russia has recently thrown its weight behind the SAF after a Russian delegation last April visited Port Sudan — the de facto government capital of Sudan during the war.
The SAF has, over the past month, made significant gains in the war: By Tuesday the SAF had reportedly encircled the RSF-occupied Presidential Palace. Meanwhile, Sudan's government last week announced a postwar political roadmap, with one goal being to establish a transitional government, which could hasten the establishment of a Russian base.
Why it’s complicated: In addition to the ongoing war in Sudan and the uncertainty of Sudan's future, the establishment of the base will also face domestic and foreign political hurdles. The agreement must be ratified first by the Sudanese government, which currently lacks a legislative body following a coup in 2019 and the subsequent dissolving of the Transitional Sovereignty Council in 2021. In order for the agreement to be enacted, the Sudanese government must first regain its own footing, a prospect that may be far off.
Anton Mardasov, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, told Al-Monitor that Russia will also have to grapple with “the position of the UAE and [Libyan National Army commander Khalifa] Hifter,” both key allies of Sudan’s RSF, if the naval base moved ahead.
Libya's National Army and the UAE have both provided material support to the RSF. The UAE, a formidable economic and political force in the region, has long sought access to Sudanese mineral and agricultural resources, ports and land. Interference from the UAE — and Libya — in Sudan's war is likely a bid at guaranteeing such access. Russia will thus have to contend with other outside interests that have thrown their weight behind government opposition.
Why it matters: The naval base, which would be Russia’s first in Africa, would provide it access to the Red Sea, which is a route that accounts for roughly 12% of global oil shipments and 10% of all global seaborne trade, according to the Center for Economic Policy Research. Access to the Red Sea would be key for Russia economically, particularly as it looks to gain leverage in the Middle East and Africa.
Mardasov says the naval base would help to cement Moscow’s economic role in both Africa and the Middle East, and allow it to fulfill its “economic promises.”
“It's clear Moscow is trying not only to expand its logistical capabilities, but also to build insurance routes to supply its assets in Africa,” Mardasov said.
For Russia, there is also a degree of urgency to the base’s military aspect; along with providing a counterbalance to a US base in Djibouti, the Russians are also hoping to protect their regional presence. In December, following the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad — a key Russian ally in the region — Russia’s key naval base in Tartous, Syria, seemed to be in jeopardy. Following the ouster of Assad, the new Syrian government in January terminated a contract with a Russian company that had managed the Tartous port.
Yet Russia has not yet lost its entire grip in Syria. Last Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, held their first phone call, during which al-Sharaa emphasized “Syria’s openness to all parties in a way that serves the interests of the Syrian people.” Syria has not shut the door on Russia. Meanwhile, since late December, when an American delegation met with senior Syrian officials, the United States has not engaged publicly with the Syrian government, leaving ample room for Russia to establish a relationship with the new government.
