Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has often been obviated from any security arrangement or any major strategic decision in the Gulf. Though this never seemed logical, it was regularly justified by concerns over security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states and lack of international legitimacy for engaging Iran constructively. Others hid behind ideological drives. The results were naturally disastrous. The Iranian nation suffered unjustly, Sunni-Shiite frontiers were being created between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran kept seeking international recognition and security assurances, most recently through the nuclear enrichment project.

This scene has changed. According to the 2014 Arab Youth Survey, Arab youth believe that their countries’ biggest allies are their regional neighbors.

The GCC, as a cooperative arrangement with an objective to becoming a union, had a congenital fault at its very nascent stage. The alliance was born out of fear of the Iranian Revolution and potential destabilization of the monarchical regimes in the Gulf. Considering that Iran was the GCC’s raison d’etre, there was a clear division vis-a-vis the Iranian dossier. The GCC member states remained reactionary, without an independent strategic security vision, despite Omani Sultan Qaboos’ several attempts. The vacuum was often filled with rhetoric, and later with bilateral security arrangements with countries whose national security interests may be at odds with those of the GCC. Iran before 1979 was the US policeman in the Gulf, a role that Iran might assume once again in the near future.

Compared with the European Union, the GCC lacks economic underpinnings despite the ratified economic treaties. Moreover, insignificant intra-trade volume and minimal industrial complementarity are not conducive to economic cooperation, let alone a unified currency. Instead of working together to build a solid unified economic bloc, the GCC countries seem to be in increasing competition with each other over economic projects. Statements from GCC officials point out that the GCC intra-trade is still below set targets and does not represent more than 10% of the GCC trade exchange, which is plagued by excessive reliance on hydrocarbon exports of about 83%. The national economic agendas were used to mask personal gains for influential individuals. The GCC was evidently going nowhere.