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Hamas surprises Israel

Western analysts misjudged the actions of a desperate Hamas, which considers honor and face-saving above all, launching an attack against Israel when it has nothing to lose.

An ultra-Orthodox Jew speaking on a mobile phone gestures in front of a fire that broke out after a rocket landed near the southern town of Sderot July 9, 2014. Israeli air strikes shook Gaza every few minutes on Wednesday, and militants kept up rocket fire at Israel's heartland in intensifying warfare that Palestinian officials said has killed at least 37 people in the Hamas-dominated enclave. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun (ISRAEL - Tags: POLITICS MILITARY CIVIL UNREST RELIGION) - RTR3XTBG
An Israeli man speaking on a mobile phone gestures in front of a fire that broke out after a rocket landed near the southern town of Sderot, July 9, 2014. — REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun

Before the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip, former Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas senior official Mahmoud al-Zahar and the spokesman for the movement’s military wing Abu Obeida all promised that if Israel attacks Gaza, it could expect all sorts of surprises. And, indeed, we must admit that Hamas has managed to surprise.

But the surprise isn’t the firing of long-range rockets (ever since Operation Pillar of Defense, it has been established that Hamas has rockets that can reach Tel Aviv). It is the fact that despite its miserable situation, after so many people wrote the movement off and predicted its demise, Hamas still dares to fire dozens of rockets at Israel in what is commonly seen as a suicidal move.

On July 4, my colleague Ben Caspit published an article in Al-Monitor titled, “Hamas is fighting for its life.” He wrote how two basic assumptions of the Israeli security system were disproved in a single day. “[T]he last thing Hamas needs right now is a round of violence,” he was told by a senior security official, who assumed that Hamas had been deterred and wanted silence at all costs. The second assumption was that a third intifada would not break out. The Palestinians were too tired, drained and beaten down after many long years of conflict.

The research units of Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet, as well as academic researchers and other authorities on the movement, are constantly analyzing Hamas in an attempt to foresee what it will do next. The problem is that the tools most of them apply in this analysis are based on more familiar Western patterns of logic and therefore irrelevant to the Islamic movements in the Middle East. Logic would dictate — which is also the source of the flawed assumption — that if Hamas is in a state of crisis and its leaders are concerned for the future and fate of their movement, they would keep a low profile. They would not dare getting into another clash with Israel, especially one where the outcome is known in advance.

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