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Iraq Sends Mixed Signals on Syria

Iraqi Shiites have not been quick to endorse the Syrian uprising, partly out of fear of the rise of Salafist groups, writes Mushreq Abbas.

Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari (R) talks with an Omani Foreign Affairs representative as they attend the Arab League foreign ministers' meeting on Syria at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo November 12 , 2012.   REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih (EGYPT - Tags: POLITICS) - RTR3ABK8
Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari (R) talks with an Omani Foreign Affairs representative as they attend the Arab League foreign ministers' meeting on Syria at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo Nov. 12 , 2012. — REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih

Do Shiites in Iraq really fear that extremist Islamic Sunni movements will take the reins in Syria after the fall of the Baathist regime of President Bashar al-Assad? Or does the real fear lie in undermining the chances of Shiite expansion in the Middle East?

In other words, do concerns of national interest control Iraqi Shiite perspectives toward the Syrian crisis, as in fears that this country might become a source of terrorism for Iraq? Or is the issue related to a project that surpasses  local considerations and is linked to the location of the Shiites on the region’s map?

At first glance, both justifications seem plausible, and neither hides Shiite reservations over the toppling of Assad. He belongs to the Alawite sect, which is relatively close to the Shiites and is strategically allied with the country that leads the Shiite scene in the region, Iran.

However, these reservations are intrinsically controversial, due to the vagueness of the reasons behind the sympathy with the Assad regime, which embraces the Baath Party’s ideology. Over 30 years ago, Iraq’s Shiites revolted against the Baath Party and blamed it for the political, economic and moral collapse of the country. Given this history, the Iraqi legislature was obliged to include the Baath Party on a list of constitutionally prohibited organizations and ideologies. This step has allowed the implementation of policies of “de-Baathification” in the government’s institutions against thousands of Baathists.

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