China shores up Iran support as Trump seeks exit

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WASHINGTON — US President Donald Trump’s announcement on Tuesday that the US was pausing its military operation escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz after just one day, came as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi landed in China for his first visit there since the war began 68 days ago. 

Beijing sees the writing on the wall and is entering the conversation at exactly the moment when Trump is looking for a way out of the war while continuing to align itself with Iran. 

The meeting between Araghchi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on Wednesday, as Rosaleen Carroll reports, was yet another indication of Beijing's political support for Iran since the war started, but also an opportunity for China to help Trump find an exit to the war. The meeting, exactly a week before Trump's long-awaited visit to Beijing, gives China the upper hand to control the agenda and exercise leverage in the Hormuz stalemate and the nuclear file. 

➡️ How China is showing support for Iran 

• From the outset of the war, China has shown support by continuing to purchase Iranian oil and keeping trade channels open. Over the weekend, China's Ministry of Commerce ordered domestic companies not to comply with US sanctions targeting five Chinese oil refiners linked to Iranian crude imports.
• China has provided political cover for Iran in international forums and in public statements. That support culminated in China vetoing a UN Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz on April 7, 2026. The Emirati-Bahraini draft aimed to reopen the waterway and protect commercial shipping, but both China and Russia blocked it.
• Multiple reports say China has supplied or facilitated dual-use material that could support Iran’s missile and drone capabilities.
Those reports include claims about drone deliveries, missile-related components and even satellite-linked help that could improve targeting.

➡️  What is China's endgame? 

• Early in the war, China concluded that the US and Israeli goals of forcing regime change or securing denuclearization in Iran were unrealistic. That assessment only hardened as the conflict dragged on and the Iranian system consolidated control. From Beijing’s perspective, the war then became an opportunity to weaken the US position, expand its own leverage and present itself as a potential broker if it's able to get something in return. 
• China understands how badly Trump wants an exit from the conflict. But timing is critical: If no agreement is reached before Trump arrives in China on Thursday, Beijing would be better positioned to set the agenda, while Washington would be weaker in pressing for other concessions on trade, security and technology.

➡️  Can China emerge as a broker?

• Beijing is trying to play that role but in a way that would give it an edge in the Gulf and with Iran. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement that China brokered in 2023 already offers a blueprint.
That deal was widely seen as proof that Beijing can talk to rival regional powers, but this one would introduce it as a global security player via the Middle East. 
• It would also serve China’s long-term interests in postwar Iran, where Beijing wants to protect access to energy, trade and strategic influence. The trajectory of the conflict suggests that Iran will emerge more dependent on China after the war, especially with the hits to its infrastructure, its ballistic missile program and its currency and economy. The ascendance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran points to a more authoritarian and militarized form of government that is likely to lean heavier on Beijing. 

Joyce’s take: China may be one of the few powers with enough leverage over Iran, enough credibility with Gulf states and enough diplomatic value for Trump to help open an off-ramp from war. The challenge is that Beijing may have influence, but not necessarily control. Tehran may listen to but not follow Chinese advice if Iranian leaders believe continued control of Hormuz serves their interests or, on the opposite side, if Trump or Israel decide to continue the war.